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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD 
ANDREWS and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, \ 
vs. : 
RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, 
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE, 
Members Salt Lake Council, 
Defendants/Appellants 
: Case No. 92-0233 
Priority #16 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES in response to the Briefs of 
Appellants and of the amicus curiae the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns, submits the following Brief of Appellees: 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. (a) Issue 
Was the trial court correct in ruling that article I, § 
4 of the Utah Constitution prohibits defendants\appellants 
Salt Lake^City Council members ("the City Council") from 
encouraging and presenting prayers at city council meetings? 
1 
(b) Non-Issues on Appeal 
Although the City Council identifies six (6) issues on 
appeal with many sub-parts (Appellants' Brief pp. 1 - 2), 
there is really only one issue set forth above. 
Free expression rights of City Council members are not 
implicated in this action, because as elected officials 
acting as government agents, defendants' official action may 
be and are circumscribed by the Utah Constitution. See 
Footnotes 4 and 23, infra. Nothing in the Order challenged 
on appeal inhibits defendants own private practice of 
religion including prayer while not acting as a government 
official. 
"Speech and debate11 immunity of legislators under the 
Utah and United States Constitutions is not implicated here-
in, because defendants were sued in their administrative and 
executive capacities rather than legislative, and those 
protections apply only to members of the Utah legislature or 
United States Congress, not city council members. U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 6; Ut. Const. Art. VI, § 8. They were not 
sued or enjoined because their debated or enacted the 
unconstitutional practice; they were sued to prevent contin-
uation of that practice. 
The injunction as entered by the Trial Court does not 
violate Rule 65A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because based upon common usage a reasonable person would 
know and understand what conduct is now prohibited. 
2 
Trial courts are and should be reluctant to declare as 
unconstitutional the conduct and enactments of other 
branches of government. Nonetheless, plaintiffs herein 
established the unconstitutional nature of defendants' 
conduct by the necessary "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Although two defendant City Council Members, Tom 
Godfrey and Nancy Pace voted against the City Council7s 
enactment of its opening prayer policy, (T.R. pp. 444-447), 
neither of those defendants confessed judgment, admitted 
error or conceded the unconstitutionality of the prayer 
policy. Thus, a judgment and injunction against them was 
proper and necessary in this case. 
Suit against individual City Council members to enjoin 
their future unconstitutional conduct is and was proper. 
The injunction against them limits only their official 
conduct. This action was not for personal monetary 
liability but only for declaratory and injunctive relief; 
the only monetary judgment herein was an award of court 
costs ($103.00). Defendants were not sued for a legislative 
decision to enact their prayer policy, but for their on-
going administrative and executive acts in following the 
prayer policy. 
(c) Non-Issues in this Case 
Throughout this case and in their Brief, appellants 
complained that the relief sought and the ruling of the 
Trial Court will have disastrous effects upon all of Utah as 
3 
we know it today• This Court must focus on what is really 
at issue herein: enjoining formal prayers encouraged as 
part of official meetings of the Salt Lake City Council. 
The plaintiffs/appellants have not argued and did not 
request in this action: 
To ban any and all prayer on public property; (contra 
Appellants/ Brief, p. 27; p. 44) ;* 
To prevent the City Council from administering oaths 
using the words "so help you God"; (contra Id., p. 44); 
To prevent any mention of the word God by defendants; 
(contra Id., p. 15); 
To prevent City Council members or members of the 
public from practicing their own religion or using God's 
name in vain, as long as it is not part of the official 
program of the City Council meeting; (contra Id., p. 44); 
To prevent the recitation of the phrase "one nation 
under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance; (contra Id., p. 45); 
To end the singing of the Star Spangled Banner; 
(contra Id.); 
To prohibit the reading from the backs of dollar bills 
("In God We Trust") or from historical documents ("Grateful 
to Almighty God . . . " Preamble, Ut. Const.); (contra Id.); 
To invalidate legislation that makes Christmas, Easter 
and Pioneer Day state holidays; (contra Id.: contra Brief of 
Amicus, League, p. 22); 
To end tax exempt status for churches; (contra Brief of 
Amicus, League, p. 11); 
To end the singing of Handel's Messiah in Symphony Hall 
or the Salt Lake City & County Building or public schools; 
(contra Brief of Appellants, p. 45) ; 
To disallow chapels and chaplains at the Utah State 
Prison; 
1
 Obviously such a ban would not be premissiablet under 
the free exercise provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
4 
To end prayers before the Utah State Legislature;2 
To prevent the recitation of prayers in a city owned 
cemetery; nor, 
To prevent the objective teaching of comparative 
religions in public colleges. 
Enjoined herein is encouragement and support for formal 
prayers as part of official meetings of the Salt Lake City 
government, that is all. The hysteria and specter of 
defendants' list of horrors might be entertaining to a first 
year law student and some of the issues may warrant future 
litigation, but none of them are before this Court nor were 
they before the Trial Court. This case deals solely with 
government sponsored and encouraged prayer using municipal 
resources as part of an official governmental meeting. 
II. Standard of Review 
As determined by the court below, plaintiffs/appellees 
(collectively "the Society'1) are entitled to summary 
judgement as a matter of law. Because the trial court7s 
ruling is a legal conclusion, this Court should review it 
for correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988). 
2
 Although clearly unconstitutional such a practice 
may be beyond judicial intervention based upon the doctrine 
of separation of powers. Ut. Const. Art. V, § 1 . 
5 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The constitutional provision controlling is Utah 
Constitution, article I, § 4: 
The right of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; . . • There shall be no union 
of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate 
the State or interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesi-
astical establishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the 
appropriation of public funds in the aid of religious 
worship or exercise. Accordingly, the Society challenged 
the City Council's planning for and including public prayers 
in the opening ceremonies of council meetings, seeking 
relief to end the practice. The City Council's policy 
requires the expenditure of public money in aid of religious 
exercise, threatens the strict separation of church and 
state mandated by article I, § 4, and interferes with 
religious autonomy. 
Central to the resolution of this case is the absolute 
and specific language of article I, § 4 . Far from a mere 
restatement of federal guarantees, the Utah Constitution 
embodies and then expands upon the First Amendment, assert-
ing the right of citizens to espouse their religious beliefs 
6 
without interference from the state, to have a government 
free of sectarian influence or control and to have no public 
funds spent in support of religious practices. Against 
these detailed guarantees, this Court must measure the 
soliciting and presenting of prayers to open city council 
meetings. Importantly, because no Utah Supreme Court cases 
have interpreted the state's establishment provision in the 
context of governmental prayer, the issue is one of first 
impression. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On September 26, 1991, the Society filed this action 
against the City Council, seeking determination that prayers 
at City Council meetings is unconstitutional under article 
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Exhibit "A" attached; T.R. p. 2. In addition, the Society 
requested that the trial court permanently enjoin the City 
Council from soliciting and presenting prayers as a planned 
and official part of its future assemblies. Id. Both 
parties filed motions for summary judgement. 
After hearing, Judge J.D. Frederick of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County granted summary 
judgment, granting declaratory and injunctive relief,3 as 
3
 While the trial court's order enjoins the City 
Council from "allowing or having prayers recited at meetings 
of the Salt Lake City Council . . . [and] from expending 
public funds, resources or property to support or encourage 
such prayers," (Order Granting Summary Judgment at 2-3; T.R. 
7 
set forth in the court's Memorandum Decision of March 2, 
1992, (Exhibit "B"; T.R. p. 978), and later embodied in an 
Order Granting Summary Judgment signed April 9, 1992, 
Exhibit "C"; T.R. p. 1055. Post-judgment motions were 
resolved on April 15, 1992. Exhibit nD,f attached; T.R. p. 
1063. The City Council filed this appeal on May 1, 1992. 
Judge Frederick based his decision on the specific 
language of article I, §4, insisting that when the language 
of a constitutional provision is "clear and unambiguous,w no 
further examination of legislative intent is necessary. 
Memorandum Decision at 11, citing Rampton v. Barlow. 464 
P.2d 378 (Utah 1970). Because M[t]he language of the Utah 
Constitution sets forth the absolute law which government 
officials are bound to follow,11 the City Council's prayer 
practice is unconstitutional. Memorandum Decision at 13. 
The policy of planning for and presenting public prayers at 
city council meetings improperly entangled the state in non-
secular activities and expended public funds in support of 
religious worship. Id. at 13-14. 
Finally, the trial court was influenced by other state 
courts which have interpreted provisions of constitutions 
at p. 1055), the Society understands this to mean that the 
City Council may not solicit and incorporate prayers into 
the official activities which make up its meetings. 
Appropriately, the injunction would not govern the speech of 
individual City Council members or third parties which is 
not a part of the formally sanctioned functions and 
operations of the meetings. 
8 
comparable to article I, $ 4. Id. at 9-11. Noting that 
California and Oregon courts refused to be restricted by 
federal establishment law when determining the scope of 
state constitutional guarantees, the trial court likewise 
declined to read the detailed and specific language of 
article I, § 4 as being constrained by the First Amendment.4 
Id. citing, Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 
P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991); Kay v. Douglas School District, 719 
P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd and dismissed on other 
grounds, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987). The trial court also 
agreed with the characterization of state sponsored prayers 
as unconstitutional because the practice "appears to place 
the government's stamp of approval on a particular type of 
religious practice, such as public prayer." Id. citing 
Sands at 816. 
4
 Clearly, the free exercise and free speech clauses 
of the United States Constitution prevent the reach of 
Utah's establishment guarantees from unconstitutionally 
infringing upon the exercise of these First Amendment 
rights. However, no such infringement occurs here. Ample 
precedent indicates that teachers, for example, can be 
prevented from conducting religious exercises in class rooms 
in the name of separation of church and state without 
violating the free exercise and speech rights of the 
teachers. For example, See Bowen v. Rov. 467 U.S. 693, 
699-700 (1986) ("The free exercise clause simply cannot be 
understood to require the government to conduct its own 
internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious 
beliefs of a particular citizen."); Abinaton School District 
v. Schemmpp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (right to free 
exercise does not mean that individuals can "use the 
machinery of the state to practice [their] beliefs"); 
Witters v. State Commission of the Blind. 771 P.2d 1119 
(Wash. 1989). 
9 
III. Statement of Facts5 
On September 10, 1991# the City Council opened its 
meeting with a prayer by a Salt Lake City Police Chaplin: 
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this night 
to be able to meet in this forum and we ask Thee 
to bless those who participate, that their minds 
will be clear and decisions will be made that will 
be fair and equitable to the citizens of the city. 
We are grateful for our government. We are 
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we are 
grateful for the safe return of our troops from 
the Gulf. We ask these blessings in the name of 
Jesus Christ. Amen. 
Memorandum Decision at 5, f 12; T.R. p. 978. Because the 
prayer appealed for guidance from and the approval of a 
divine being the presentation constituted religious worship; 
because he requested sanctification in the name of Jesus 
Christ and refer to God as "Father" his prayer was 
denominational and sectarian. Plaintiffs7 Responser H 11, 
13; Affidavit of Wm. Whisner; T.R. p. 544. Indeed, despite 
formal statements of the City Council to the contrary, at 
least two members appreciate that this and all invocations 
offered before the City Council were presented for religious 
5
 The facts are not in dispute in this case because of 
defendants' failure to timely respond to certain requests 
for admission from plaintiff. Requests were served by hand 
upon defendants' counsel on December 3, 1991 (T.R. p. 558; 
p. 923). Defendants acknowledge that they responded out of 
time to those requests on January 6, 1992 (T.R. p. 925, 
926). Defendants have never requested relief from their 
admissions. The requests (T.R. p. 558-574) are conclusively 
deemed admitted. 
10 
purposes.6 Memorandum Decision, J 7; Meeting Minutes, 
Remarks of Nancy Pace and Tom Godfrey; T.R. p. 687.7 
The Society requested the City Council halt the 
practice of planning and presenting prayers at city council 
meetings, defendants refused. Memorandum Decision, I 13; 
T.R. p. 978. Plaintiffs filed suit on September 26, 1991. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint; Exhibit "A"; T.R p. 2. 
When the September 10th prayer was presented and prior 
to October 17, 1991, the City Council had no written policy 
concerning the content of the prayers to be given at its 
meetings. Memorandum Decision, J 6; Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' 
Response"), J 7; T.R. p. 655. However, responding to this 
action, the City Council adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy 
on October 17, 1991 by a vote of 5 to 2. Id. While this 
formal policy declares a preference for non-denominational 
and non-proselytizing presentations, the City Council is 
powerless to dictate contents of prayers given at their 
6
 According to Tom Godfrey, Council member Hale also 
admitted publicly that the purpose of including prayers in 
city council opening ceremonies was religious. Meeting 
Minutes, Remarks of Tom Godfrey, T.R. at 687. 
7
 Nancy Pace commented candidly on the City Council's 
quickly enacted Opening Policy: "I don't believe that what 
were doing [offering prayers] could be construed as secular 
and I don't believe that would hold up in court." Meeting 
Minutes, Remarks of Nancy Pace; T.R. p. 687. In the same 
context, Tom Godfrey insisted that the new policy "smacks of 
legal and verbal gymnastic and is therefore dishonest. It 
has always been the Council's intent to offer prayers for a 
religious purpose . . . ." Meeting Minutes, Remarks of Tom 
Godfrey; T.R. p. 687. 
11 
meetings.8 Memorandum Decision, 5 8; Suggestions For Those 
Who Present Thoughts/Readings/Invocations in Salt Lake City 
Council Meetings; T.R. p. 687. Indeed, Council member 
Godfrey acknowledged that the City Council's intention to 
have non-denominational prayers has not been realized.9 
Memorandum Decision, I 10; T.R. p. 978. 
Prayers have not been a traditional part of Salt Lake 
City government meetings. Since the 1896 passage of the 
Utah Constitution, prayers were part of city meetings for 
only 28 years. Memorandum Decision, 5f 1 and 5. From 1911 
to 1979, while the Salt Lake City form of government com-
bined the executive and legislative functions, prayers were 
rarely offered during the meetings of the Commission. Memo-
randum Decision, 5 1; T.R. p. 978. When city government was 
modified in 1980 to separate the executive and legislative 
functions, prayers were usually offered as part of weekly 
meetings,10 although this practice was suspended in 1987 
8
 Interestingly, while the suggestions requests 
"thoughts, readings and invocations," the Opening Cetremony 
Policy instructs the Council staff to invite ,fa wide variety 
of churches and other civic organizations" to contact the 
police chaplin concerning these presentations. Opening 
Ceremony Policy; Suggestions For Those Who Present 
Thoughts/Readings/Invocations; T.R. p. 687. 
9
 Interesting free exercise ramifications are caused 
by the City Council even "suggesting" how one should pray. 
10
 Actually, between 1980 and 1987, defendants candidly 
admit that their practice was to have prayers — not 
thoughts or reading — as part of the city council meetings. 
Defendants' Statement of Facts, H 18 and 20 Brief of 
Appellants. 
12 
until May of 1988 while the prayer policy was reconsidered. 
Memorandum Decision, J 5; T.R. p. 978. Based on this suit, 
the prayer practice was again discontinued on April 19, 
1992. Order Summary Judgment; T.R. p. 1055. 
The City Council acknowledges that public facilities 
are furnished and public funds spent to plan for and present 
prayers at its meetings. Memorandum Decision, 1 14; T.R. p. 
978. The use of city equipment (microphones, stages, etc.), 
resources (electricity, paper, etc.), and employee time (to 
plan for, supervise, attend, etc.) are necessary ingredients 
to the scheduling, performance and witnessing of the 
prayers. Id. For example, the City Police Chaplin 
coordinated the council opening ceremonies and scheduled 
religious leaders to give prayers at meetings. Memorandum 
Decision, 1 8 . A Salt Lake City employee spent two (2) days 
in the fall of 1990 soliciting religious leaders to give 
prayers. Id. 1 9 . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The absolute language of article I, S 4 prohibits the 
City Council from planning for and including prayers in its 
meetings. This practice violates the Utah constitutional 
guarantees of absolute separation of church and state, and 
breaches the government duty not to spend public funds on 
religious worship. Given principles of statutory and 
constitutional construction, this interpretation is the only 
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conclusion harmonious with Utah case law and the law of 
states with similar constitutional directives. 
The imperative of article I, § 4 cannot be superseded 
by appeals to less reliable methods of statutory 
construction. The text of article I, § 4 is not ambiguous, 
thus, the plain meaning of the provision determines and 
displays the legislative intent. When faced with clear 
constitutional language — as in this case — courts enforce 
the specific direct command of the provision. 
A literal reading of article I, § 4 is consistent with 
the case law from states with similar constitutional 
provisions. These state courts have been faithful to the 
specific language of their state charters. To preserve a 
wall between church and state, they have upheld the 
prohibition against the expenditure of public money to 
support religious exercise or to aid religious institutions. 
Finally, although no reported Utah cases have dealt 
with religious entanglement as direct as government 
sponsored prayer, those which have interpreted article I, § 
4 recognize that public funds cannot spent to support 
religious institutions. Only when the challenged 
appropriations did not benefit religious organizations, did 
this Court approve the proposed allocation. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the strong language of article 
I, § 4, this Court should uphold the trial court and 
14 
permanently enjoin the City Council from soliciting and 
presenting prayers during its meetings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Text of Article I, § 4 Is the Only Determinative and 
Reliable Indication of the Purpose and Meaning of the 
Constitutional Provision. 
The trial court correctly relied upon the text of 
article I, § 4 to declare the City Council's prayer policy 
unconstitutional. The unconditional terms of article I, § 4 
leave little room for clarification. The fundamentals of 
constitutional interpretation indicate that when the 
language is not ambiguous, the source of legislative intent 
is the provision itself. Resort to exotic and less reliable 
statutory constructions is unnecessary and undesirable to 
establish the meaning of passages subject to ready literal 
interpretation. Attempts to determine the meaning of an 
instrument by references to legislative history are dubious 
at best, involving guesses as to the subjective intent and 
bypassing the letter of the law in favor of speculative 
enterprises. 
A. Only when the instrument is unclear, will this Court 
look beyond the relevant text to determine legislative 
intent• 
To determine legislative intent, this Court invariably 
looks to the text of the provision: "[W]e being with the 
statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods 
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of statutory interpretation only if we find the language of 
the statutes to be ambiguous." State v. Vigil. 194 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 9, 10, P2d. (1992). The policy reasons 
for relying upon statutory and constitutional language are 
evident — the court is not to act as a "super constitu-
tional convention" and must avoid imposing constructed 
meaning upon the original words of a law. General Electric 
Co. v. Thrifty Sales. 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956). 
This Court is particularly willing to heed the letter 
of a constitutional provision. For example, in Hansen v. 
Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980), this Court focused upon the 
exact wording of state and federal provisions to determine 
if the Utah constitutional protection — although differ-
ently worded — should be given the same import as its 
federal counterpart. Giving significance to the unique word 
choice of article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution, the 
Hansen Court confirmed: 
In legal formulation, it is to be assumed that the 
words used were chosen advisedly. This is 
particularly true in such foundational documents 
as constitutions, which it can be assumed are 
framed with greater than usual care and 
deliberation. 
Id. at 317. In self-incrimination law, this Court concluded 
that the Utah guarantee which spared the accused from having 
to "to give evidence against" herself "was intended to mean 
something different and broader than the comparable federal 
provision." Id. Declining to second guess the language, 
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this Court assumed the constitutional framers meant what 
they said.11 
While various techniques are available for inter-
pretation of an ambiguous word or phrase in a statutory 
provision, these devices are meant to supplement vague 
language, never to override the text. References outside 
the document are made only when the text is unclear, and 
then only as an interpretive device, not as a means to 
ignore or contradict the language at issue. This Court has 
repeated confirmed that principle of statutory construction, 
declaring that "if we accept the view that there is present 
some ambiguity . . . we may look to other sources of 
11
 In the context of the separation of powers, this 
Court also looked to the specific language of article V, § 1 
of the Utah Constitution to determine its meaning. Matheson 
v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, (Utah 1982). Reference to elements 
outside the document were unnecessary to establish the 
intent of the framers. The authors of the Utah Constitution 
thought the doctrine of separation of powers so essential to 
the workings of state government that they included a 
specific provision to guarantee its preservation: "Unlike 
the Federal Constitution, [this] principle is not left to be 
deduced from the general structure of the Constitution." 
Id, at 689. (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, four 
separate opinions). Justice Stewart insisted that the 
precise wording signaled the framers' intent to secure the 
independence of the various branches of the government. The 
language left no room for further interpretation: 
The framers of the Constitution considered the 
principle embodied in article V, § 1 to be of such 
importance that they wrote that provision to 
prevent its erosion by implication, strained 
constructions, or any means which would have the 
effect of enfeebling that great, overreaching 
principle of constitutional government. [emphasis 
added] 
Id. at 689-690. 
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interpretation to clarify the instrument." (Emphasis added) 
Univ. of Ut. v. Board of Examinersf 295 P.2d 348, 360 (Utah 
1956). Accordingly, this Court ultimately relied upon text 
of the Constitution to reject the contention that the 
University was a constitutional corporation free from 
legislative control. Id. The Court found no textual basis 
for this claim. 
Alternatively, to identify the powers of the State 
Treasurer, this Court was forced to examine the 
responsibilities of the Territorial Treasurer to give 
meaning to the phrase "other duties". Allen v. Rampton, 463 
P.2d 7, 8 (Utah 1969). However, this reference to 
legislative history was necessary only because the relevant 
constitutional provision made mention of the indefinite 
"other duties" required of the office. Id. 
This Court did not look beyond the express langruage of 
the Constitution to determine the appropriate powers of the 
Governor. Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970). 
Indeed# the language of the Constitution took precedent over 
practices contrary to its dictates and long accepted by all 
branches of the government: 
The practical construction placed on constitu-
tional provisions, when long acquiesced in is of 
aid to the courts in determining the meaning of 
the language of a constitutional provision, but it 
cannot be controlling so as to amend the 
Constitution by means of a series of mutual 
mistakes, and especially is this true where the 
language is otherwise clear. [emphasis added] 
Id. at 382. 
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Principles of constitutional construction hold that the 
language of article I, $ 4 should be the fundamental source 
of its meaning. This is particularly true because the words 
of the provision are detailed and clear, because special 
deference is granted to the word choice of constitutional 
drafters, and because the provision contains no vague 
references needy of further elaboration. Finally, textual 
analysis is both more reliable and more consistent with 
principles of judicial restraint than attempts to divine the 
meaning of words by reference outside the instrument. 
Accordingly, article I, § 4 should be read as saying what it 
means — any use or appropriation of public funds in aid of 
religious worship is unconstitutional. 
B. Arguments Concerning Practices at the Constitutional 
Convention and the Alleged Tradition of Prayer at city 
Council Meetings Are Not Applicable to Interpretations of 
article I, § 4. 
Despite clear language of article I, § 4 , the City 
Council suggests that the text of the provision be ignored 
so that the meaning of the passage can be divined from 
sources outside the instrument. The City Council insists 
that framers of article I, $ 4 would not have participated 
in their daily practice of prayer if they considered this 
exercise to be a violation of the provision they were in the 
process of enacting. This argument is suspect. 
First, to become law, the Utah's Constitution had to be 
approved both by the male people of the territory of Utah 
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and by the United States Congress. When these individuals 
ratified the Constitution, they did so on the basis of their 
understanding of the document. If this Court resorts to the 
City Council's technique of statutory construction — 
divining the meaning from the subjective intentions of those 
involved in drafting and ratifying the document — to 
interpret the document, it would have to ascertain the mind 
set and review the conduct of all these many thousands of 
relevant actors. A sound alternative to this dubious 
process is for this Court to assume that these actors took 
the document at face value and gave its words their plain 
meaning. See, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 815 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)n 
Second, the conduct of the delegates to the last Utah 
Constitution Convention is not necessarily indicative of the 
purpose and meaning of the instrument. Importantly, their 
behavior was not required to be and is not guaranteed to be 
impeccable or worthy of emulation. As Justice Brennan said 
of the members of the First Congress to the United States 
who began a practice of public prayers: •• [Legislators, 
12
 Justice Brennan contends that actions of the First 
Congress cannot be determinative of legislative intent when 
the States ultimately ratified the U.S. Constitution ~ "the 
understanding of the States should be as relevant to our 
analysis as the understandincj of Congress." Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 at 815. Indeed, Brennan continued: "To treat 
any practice authorized by the First Congress as presump-
tively consistent with the Bill of Rights is therefore 
somewhat akin to treating any action of a party to a 
contract as presumptively consistent with the terms of the 
contract." Id. at 816. 
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influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the 
pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of 
business, do not always pass sober judgment on every piece 
of legislation they enact . . . ." Marsh v, Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, footnotes 
omitted). Despite their good intentions, the drafters of 
the Utah Constitution may not have been able or willing to 
comply with the strict mandate of the law which they and 
their constituents ratified. There is no indication that 
the framers wished to codify their actions (rather than 
their words) into the text of the Utah Constitution. 
Instead, the framers intended to establish as law, certain 
principles which they dutifully wrote down and ratified. 
See, Marsh, supra, at 816 (fl[T]he Constitution is not a 
static document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for 
all time by the life experience of the Framers."). 
Indeed, history actually shows that the convention 
delegates intentionally condoned at least two practices 
which did not conform to the provisions of the Constitution 
they authored. Although all participants in the final Utah 
constitutional convention were white males,13 and only males 
were allowed to vote to ratify the document, the 
Constitution granted women the right to vote and further 
established that "[b]oth male and female citizens of this 
13
 Those male delegates are affectionately referred to 
by the City Council as the "Founding Fathers of Utah." 
Defendants7 Summary Judgment Memorandum, at 38, T.R. p. 189. 
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State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious 
rights and privileges." Article IV, § 2 and article IV, § 
1, Utah Constitution. To follow the City Council's 
reasoning herein, the unwillingness of the "founding 
fathers" to allow women to join in drafting and enacting of 
Utah's Constitution as equals should override the plain 
language of these provisions. The City Council tells us 
since words do not mean what they say and the actions of 
delegates are more telling of their intent — according the 
defendants' method of constitutional interpretation — Utah 
law does not recognize the right of women to vote or to 
enjoy the civil rights afforded to men.14 
Finally, should tradition somehow be relevant to the 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, defendants cannot 
legitimately argue any long practice to allow or encourage 
prayer.15 The City Council acknowledges that there were 
14
 Another disquieting proposition results from the 
City Council's analysis of the subjective intent of the 
constitution's framers. Several of the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were high members of the Mormon 
Church who were practicing polygamy (despite the Church's 
public anti-polygamy Manifesto of 1890) while they 
deliberated on the terms of the Utah Constitution. A 
significant number of the voters and community leaders that 
ratified the Utah Constitution also practiced polygamy even 
as they casted their ballots. Mormon Polygamy A History. 
Richard S. Van Wagoner, 1989, 2nd Ed., Signature Books, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
Following the City Council's analysis herein, the Utah 
Constitutional provision forever outlawing polygamy is null 
and void! Ut. Const. Art. III. 
15
 Appeals to legislative history to interpret federal 
establishment law are very rare. See, Lee v. Weisman. 
U.S. , 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992) (rejecting the 
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applicability of traditional practices and historical 
context to the validity of public school graduation 
ceremonies). Marsh v. Chambers carved a careful exception 
to federal establishment clause cases by upholding Nebraska 
legislative prayer on the basis of the particular history 
associated with that practice. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
Marsh was uniquely exempt from the traditional inquiry 
applied to establishment clause cases — no test was 
utilized at all. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
After demonstrating the religious purpose of prayer, the 
non-secular effect of the practice and the excessive 
entanglements it involves, the dissent concludes: "In sum, 
I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were 
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of 
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the 
practice to be unconstitutional." Id. at 800-801. Absent 
the historical unique facts applicable to the situation of 
legislative prayer, the practice would readily be declared 
unconstitutional. 
Importantly, the Marsh analysis is not relevant to this 
case. Marsh, along with all other statements of federal 
establishment clause law, is based on what it means for the 
state to establish a religion. For example, Chief Justice 
Burger referred to the First Amendment provision to uphold 
the practice of legislative prayer under federal law: "To 
invoke divine guidance on a public body entrusted with the 
making of the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 
"establishment" of religion or a step toward establishment . 
. . ." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792 (emphasis added). 
He makes no mention of prohibitions against the use of 
"public funds" for religious worship or the promise of "no 
union" between church and state relevant to the case at bar. 
The Utah Constitution is significantly different than 
the First Amendment. While article I, § 4 quotes the First 
Amendment, it has much more, including the statement that 
"[t]here shall be no union of church and state." Further 
language in the provision then indicates various ways in 
which this would be guaranteed, such as: "No public money 
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the 
support of any ecclesiastical establishment." With 
confident language, the framers expressed a conviction that 
an absolute wall of separation could be maintained. While 
the federal courts may visualize the wall of separation 
between church and state as blurred and variable, see Lemon 
v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), the Utah framers did 
not. They unhesitantly mandated restrictions on the 
spending of public funds as one way to guarantee not just a 
distinct line, but a barricade, between government and 
religion. 
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few, if any, prayers at sessions of the City Commission (the 
predecessor of the City Council) during the years 1911 -
1980 and that there were no prayers offered by the City 
Council during the seven months from October 15, 1987 
through May 17, 1988. Historical fact refutes the City 
Council's claim that prayer before Salt Lake City Council 
meetings is a "tradition of long standing." At best, 
assuming regular City Council prayers from 1900 - 1911, 1980 
- October 15, 1987, and May 17, 1988 - 1991, approximately 
seventy (70) years and seventy-seven percent (77%) of the 
twentieth century has been without City government prayers. 
Indeed, since the 1896 passage of the Utah Constitution, 
prayers were part of City government meetings for only 28 
years. Memorandum Decision, Jf 1 and 5. Contrary to 
appellants' contention, the long and predominant tradition 
of Salt Lake City government is not to have prayers. 
No where in Marsh or Lemon does the Court deal with 
language or with intent similar to that at issue here. 
Because a discussion of the special language of article I, § 
4 is lacking in federal cases, the law which they set down 
does nothing more than provide a foundation upon which the 
further guarantees of Utah law can be based. Suggesting 
that an understanding of "establishment" is the last word on 
the issue of separation between church and state is unten-
able. Such an approach ignores the intent of the Utah 
framers, endows the federal courts with the duty of 
interpreting language that is not even before them, 
belittles the role of the Utah Courts in the interpretation 
of its own state law, gypes the citizens of Utah of rights 
promised them by their own state constitution and denies 
Utah the chance to protect its citizens, in the manner it 
deems appropriate, from the intrusions and power of state 
government. 
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The task of establishing legislative intent beyond the 
text of article I, § 4 is an uncertain process.16 Because 
the actual 1896 discussion of article I, § 4 by delegates 
was minimal,17 little evidence exists to establish what was 
on the minds of the delegates — much less the voters — 
when they framed and adopted the provision.18 In addition, 
the conduct of these individuals is not necessarily an 
indication of how the instrument is to be interpreted. 
Fortunately, in pursuit of good government, the ideals of 
16
 Defendants artfully attempted to manufacture 
legislative intent in this case by including in the.Opening 
Ceremony Policy as they adopted, claims of a secular purpose 
in offering prayers. T.R. pp. 444-447. At least two (Tom 
Godfrey and Nancy Pace) and maybe three (Tom Hale) 
defendants have publicly stated that the claimed purpose is 
false and that prayers have always been and will continue to 
be offered by the City Council for religious purposes. T.R. 
p. 687. 
Finding the real legislative intent in the adoption of 
the Open Ceremony Policy will be difficult with these public 
statements that directly contradict the manufactured intent 
of the written policy. 
17
 See, Proceedings and Debates of the Utah 
Constitutional Convention (1897). 
18
 The City Council contends that the "obvious" 
motivation behind the adoption of the Utah Constitution was 
the desire to gain statehood. Since the last Utah 
Constitutional Convention was replete with appeals to the 
authority of other states and void of "expressed intent", 
the City Council suggests that this Court look to the 
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the provision. 
This argument ignores the possibility that an absence of 
expressed intent was a sign of unanimity or an indication 
that the authors believed that the words of the provision 
spoke for themselves and needed no further clarification 
from the court. Certainly, the City Council is not 
suggesting that the framers were deceiving the Utah voting 
public and the United States Congress by enacting a 
Constitution the plain meaning of which they did not intend. 
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individuals, not necessarily their actions, are perpetuated 
and emulated. Lastly, even if the behavior of the drafters 
were considered, there is NO tradition of prayer at City 
Council meetings. Rather than speculate on unresolvable 
issues, this Court should enforce the plain language of 
article I, § 4, which prohibits the City Council from 
presenting prayers at meetings. 
II. State Courts Faced With Specific and Demanding 
Provisions Similar To Article 1*5 4 Have Rigorously 
Enforced the No-Aid Mandates of Their Constitutions. 
Strict state constitutional language, similar to the 
text of article I, § 4,19 has been the basis of a clear 
divergence from federal establishment law in other states. 
The courts in these states have upheld the rigorous language 
of state provisions and have repeatedly enforced and the 
strict no-aid mandates. Accordingly, these state decisions 
confirm the conclusion that the City Council's prayer 
practice is unconstitutional. 
19
 Despite public comments to the contrary, Utah's 
constitutional establishment provisions is not out of the 
ordinary. In addition to the California, Oregon and 
Washington provisions quoted elsewhere in the brief, many 
state constitution are as detailed and as adamant in their 
separation of church and state. For a complete listing of 
the various state constitutional provisions dealing with 
establishment, free exercise and no aid to religious sects 
and schools see Exhibit ME H attached hereto. 
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A. Washington state case law, interpreting a provision 
almost identical to article I, § 4, has consistently 
enforced the strong language of its no-aid provision. 
History indicates that Utah borrowed its establishment 
provision from the Washington State Constitution and indeed, 
the similarities between the two provisions confirm this. 
Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law, Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Utah (1955) at 40-79. Article I, S 11 of the 
Washington Constitution20 recites that M[n]o public money or 
property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support 
of any religious establishment.11 In equally strong 
language, article IX, S 4 of the Washington Constitution 
guarantees that public schools will be free of sectarian 
control or influence.21 The Washington Supreme Court has 
maintained strict separation of church and state and has 
repeatedly found the specific and absolute language of its 
20
 Wash. Const, art. I, § 11 has been amended twice, in 
1904 to allow employment of chaplains at state prisons and 
in 1957 to allow chaplains at mental institutions. 
21
 Wash. Const, art. IX, S 4 reads: "All schools 
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public 
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or 
influence." Utah has a similar provision. Utah 
Constitution Article X, SS 1 and 9. Although the 
prohibition of sectarian influence on public schools is not 
directly relevant to the issues of government prayer, most 
state establishment case law involves public schools and so 
relies in part on provisions such as article IX, § 4. 
However, the holdings in these cases often deal separately 
with the more broad text of the state establishment clause. 
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state charter to demand analysis independent of and more 
rigid than federal precedent. 
Weiss v. Bruno. 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973), challenged a 
tuition scheme to benefit disadvantaged students attending 
private schools and colleges. To invalidate this program, 
the Washington Court held that the proscription of article 
IX, § 4 was determinative. Contending that the provision 
was "far stricter than the more generalized prohibition of 
the first amendment,,f the Court held that: 
There is no such thing as a Me minimis' violation 
of article IX, § 4. Nor is a violation of this 
provision determined by means of a balancing 
process. The words of article IX, § 4 mean 
precisely what they say; the prohibition is 
absolute. 
Far from surprising, Weiss followed a line of cases of 
literal reading of the absolute terms of the state Constitu-
tion. Previously, the Washington Court held that publicly 
funded transportation of children attending parochial 
schools violated both article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4. 
Mitchell v. Consol. School District No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 
(Wash. 1943), and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District 
No. 506. 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949). Further, the Court 
specifically rejected arguments that it should permit public 
transportation of private school children because such a 
program had been sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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Visser, 207 P.2d at 205.n Consistent with its rejection of 
direct and indirect aid to religious schools, the Court also 
struck down state-sponsored loan programs for college 
students at religious schools. State Higher Educ. 
Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 529 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1974). 
Witters v. St. Comm. of the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 
1989) is the Washington Court's most recent rigid interpre-
tation of the state's constitutional guarantees. After the 
U.S. Supreme Court found state assistance to a blind student 
pursuing a theological education valid under the First 
Amendment, the Washington State Supreme Court accepted the 
federal high Court's offer ,fto consider the applicability of 
the xfar stricter' dictates of the Washington State 
Constitution.•• Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the 
Blind, 475 U.S. 481, 489 rehfg denied, 475 U.S. 1091 (1986). 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state 
assistance did not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion, Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971)), the Washington Court concluded that under article 
I, § 11, no appropriations could be made for the applicant 
22
 The Court wrote: 
[W]e must, in light of the clear provisions of our 
state constitution and our decisions thereunder, 
respectfully disagree with those portions of the 
Everson majority opinion which might be construed, 
in the abstract, as stating that transportation, 
furnished at public expense, to children attending 
religious schools, is not in support of such 
schools. 
Visser, 207 P.2d at 205. (emphasis in original). 
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without violating the prohibition against public funds for 
religious instruction. Witters. 771 P.2d at 1143-1144.* 
The Court heeded the '"sweeping and comprehensive' language 
of Const, art. I, § 11, which prohibits not only the 
appropriation of public money for religious instruction, but 
also the application of public funds to religious 
instruction." Id. at 1122 (guotingr, State ex rel. Dearie v. 
Frazier, 102 Wash. 369 at 375, 173 P.2d 35 (1918) (emphasis 
original). 
Precedents of the Washington Court are instructive. 
That Court held that the foundation of their establishment 
law is the text itself and has refused to vary from its duty 
to enforce the letter of the law. Because the relevant 
provisions of the Washington Constitution have no 
counterparts in the federal constitution, the Washington 
Court has declined to limit its Constitution by 
interpretations of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the 
Washington Court has prohibited, absolutely, the public 
funding of religious worship, instruction, institutions and 
exercise. The lessons of Washington apply to interpretation 
of Utah's Constitution. As Weiss suggests, there can be no 
de minimus violation of article I, § 4's absolute ban on 
public funding of religious exercise — the prohibition is 
23
 The Witters state court decision also rejected 
arguments that the denial of aid threatened the applicant's 
free exercise rights or implicated equal protection. Id. at 
1122-1124. 
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absolute. Nor can the sweeping and comprehensive language 
of article I, § 4 be limited by federal establishment law. 
Applying Witters, regardless of debates as to the primary 
purpose or effect of any particular appropriation, article 
I, § 4 prohibits government from spending public funds on 
religious exercise. There is no exception to article I, § 4 
on the basis of secular purpose or effect; nothing in the 
text or the history approves to government funding of a 
religious exercise if there is some secular effect. 
B. Appeals for a lenient interpretation of article I, § 11, 
founded on the history of the Washington Constitutional 
Convention are problematic, unpersuasive and have been 
rejected by the Washington Court. 
The Washington Court has been always faithful to the 
language of its no-aid provision. Interestingly# in defense 
of article I, § 11, the state court has rejected an argument 
similar to — but with an interesting twist — that advanced 
herein by the Salt Lake City Council. The Washington Court 
specifically refused to conclude that despite the rigid 
language of article I, § 11, a milder interpretation is more 
consistent with the document's history and purpose. Witter 
at 1129 (Utter, J., dissenting) (advancing this contention). 
Critics of the Washington Court's "anti-establishment 
bias11 argue that history reveals that a tempered reading of 
article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4 is a more in line with 
the current interpretation of the framers' intent. Conklin 
& Vache, The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise, 8 Puget 
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Sound L.Rev. 418; Witter 771 P.2d at 1124-1132 (Utter, J., 
dissenting); Utter & Larson, Church and State on the 
Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clause in the 
Washington State Constitution, 15 Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly 451 (1988). These commentators encourage less 
reliance upon the text in favor of emphasis upon the record 
of the constitutional convention and perceived prevailing 
attitudes toward religion in the nation at the time to 
interpret the provisions,24 
After careful documentation of the "Mormon question" 
and the "Catholic question", Conklin and Vache conclude that 
the anti-establishment tone of Washington Constitution 
expressed intolerance of non-mainstream religion. Conklin & 
Vache, supra.25 These authors argue that the framers' 
express intent should not be followed because changing 
contexts today should change interpretation of the 
provisions. Conklin & Vache, supra at 457. Because the 
late 1800s' anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon bias which lead to 
the strong wording of the Washington Constitution is no 
longer a reality in today's modern era of toleration, the 
24
 The Washington Constitution was drafted in 1889. 
25
 While Utter and Larson suggest that determination 
original intent is an uncertain endeavor# they urge that the 
"sincere and thoughtful" convictions of the delegates should 
influence modern interpretations of the document. Church 
and State on the Frontier, 15 Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly at 478. What concerned these constitutional 
delegates, these authors argued, was not religious 
influences, but the specter of sectarianism. Id. 
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Court should "entertain the possibility that the 
interpretation must change to accommodate modern 
conditions." Id. They contend that because that the 
wording of article I, § 11 was over-reactionary then, the 
constitutional language should now be moderated through 
judicial re-interpretation. 
Although this argument was rejected by the Washington 
Court, the Conklin and Vache analysis has some interesting 
implications for the case at bar. From one perspective, 
this analysis supports the Society's claims that government 
meeting prayer is unconstitutional. If, at the relevant 
time, the prevailing national mood was one of intolerance, 
this evidence suggests that the Washington and Utah framers 
all actually intended to erect a large and solid wall 
between church and state and to forbid absolutely any 
expenditure of public funds to support religious 
activities.26 The convention delegates chose to exclude 
26
 On a historical note, pending before the United 
States Congress for many years beginning in 1875 was a 
proposed amendment to the United States Constitution drafted 
by James G. Blaine, United States Senator from Maine, 
directed at the individual states and providing in its 
original form: 
Article XVI: No State shall make any law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in 
any State for the support of public schools, or derived 
from any public fund therefor, nor any public land 
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any 
religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands 
so devoted be divided between religious sects or 
denominations• 
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mainstream religious influences from the public sphere by 
prohibiting the government from becoming entangled in 
religion at all. At this juncture Conklin and Vache argue 
for a departure from legislative history and strict 
establishment in favor of a revisionist more tolerant notion 
of the separation of church and state. However, a strict — 
rather than a lenient — reading of article I, § 4 is 
appropriate if the Conklin and Vache rendition of delegative 
history is adopted and allowed to influence interpretation 
of the provision. The delegates intended an uncompromising 
separation of church and statte.27 Thus, the absolute law 
embodied by article I( $ 4 prohibits public expenditures in 
support of religious exercise and prohibits the City Council 
from funding prayer. 
However, if the second prong of the Conklin and Vache 
analysis is also accepted — the argument that changing 
times should change the interpretation of the document — 
Congressional Record: Containing The Proceedings and 
Debates of the Forty-Fourth Congress, First Session. 
Later revisions added even stronger language prohibiting 
federal, state and municipal aid to religious institutions. 
This Blaine Amendment, never passed by Congress, 
resulting in part from anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon 
sentiment of the last half of the 1800's, had an influence 
on state constitutions adopted during that period. 
27
 Ut. Const, art. Ill provides "Perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment is guaranteed." The only manner in 
which to accomplish that exemplary goal is by strict 
adherence to the absolute prohibition of government aid or 
support to any religion or any religious practice. Ut. 
Const, art. I, § 4. 
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the result is improper judicial activism. For example, 
trying to decipher the disposition of the nation or a state 
(or what it was at a given time) is close to impossible. If 
the mind set of the nation is indeed to be established, 
constitutional convention delegates are in best position to 
do so, and to embody this wisdom in the words of the 
Constitution. Further, to the extent that this mood is 
somehow ascertainable, still left unresolved is the proper 
correlation between a particular mood and the reading of the 
Constitution. There is no consensus to suggest that a more 
relaxed stance on establishment law is more in line with an 
atmosphere of toleration than in line with a strict 
separation of church and state. Perhaps true religious 
toleration entails that a no-aid provision be enforced with 
greater vigor, preventing the state from becoming entangled 
in religious matters and from inviting a return to the era 
of intolerance.28 Again, delegative written judgment and 
deliberate word choice are the best sources of a solution to 
this dilemma. One must assume that the delegates properly 
registered the mood of the state and of the people and 
documented the result as a constitutional charter. 
28
 The establishment clause is not an goal or end in 
and of itself. The purpose for the establishment clause is 
to strengthen the free exercise clause and to protect an 
individual's right to freely worship. The stronger the 
establishment provision is, the stronger is the right to 
free exercise! 
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A further problem with the Conklin and Vache approach, 
and a further problem with any attempt to determine 
delegative intent# is that motives are difficult to assess 
and they are not necessarily enlightening even if there are 
discernable. The Washington Constitution may have been 
written in a time of when Christianity was seen by most as a 
positive influence upon society and Protestants dominated 
public schools# when the fear of Catholics and their 
alternative schools threatened many and when Mormons were 
discriminated against because their unusual religious 
practices offended the nation's intolerant sensibilities. 
From these observations, however, Conklin and Vache 
assume the worst — the delegates were intolerant and 
therefore Washington's article I, § 11 is an expression of 
an undesirable motivation. Alternatively, Utter and Larson 
insist that the delegates sought to avoid only sectarianism, 
speculating that the delegates were not able to express 
themselves accurately. Importantly, both views disregard 
the possibility that the delegates were offended by the 
treatment of the Mormons and by the views which perpetuated 
discrimination against Catholics and which wrongly dominated 
the public school system. Perhaps a strict separation 
between church and state was, from the perspective of these 
delegates and Washington's voters, the best remedy for a 
potentially volatile situation. The strong language of 
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article I, § 11 represents a credible and tolerant attempt 
to prevent or end religious bigotry. 
Raising more issues than it resolves, reliance upon 
legislative history to interpret a constitutional provision 
is speculative.29 Appropriately, the Washington Supreme 
Court bases its state establishment law upon the "sweeping 
and comprehensive" language of article 1,5 11 rather than 
judicial notions of what may or may not have been the intent 
of framers. This language prohibits Washington from funding 
religious activities with public money as, on its face, the 
language of Utah's article I, S 4 prohibits the City Council 
from funding prayer at governmental meetings. 
C. Consistent with the Washington Court, the courts of 
other states with constitutional no-aid provisions have 
rigidly enforced the absolute language of their state 
provisions. 
Without speculating on the intent behind the words, the 
Washington Supreme Court has chosen to interpret the 
absolute language of article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4 as 
mandating a strict separation between church and state. 
With language similar to that of the Washington 
Constitution, courts in neighboring states have also taken a 
defensive posture against attempts of government to 
establish religion. 
See footnotes 6, 7 & 16 above. 
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In Sands v. Moronao Unified School District. 809 P.2d 
809 (Cal. 1991) the California Supreme Court found that 
prayers at high school graduation ceremonies violated the 
state constitution.30 Because article XVI, S 5 of the 
California charter "prohibits not only material aid to 
religion but any official involvement that promotes 
religion," government endorsement of graduation prayers was 
deemed unconstitutional. Sands. 809 P.2d at 820. 
Additionally, the "no preference" clause of California's 
article I, § 4 — more protective of separation than the 
federal provision ~ was violated when the government 
appeared to take "positions on religious questions," by 
including prayer at graduations. Id. 
Rejecting a more dubious application of the incidental 
benefit theory argued in the court below, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that a textbook loan program to 
students of private schools was unconstitutional. Calif-
ornia Teachers Assoc, v. Riles. 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981). 
The Riles Court adopted a two-part test to determine if 
30
 Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution 
guarantees the "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion 
without discrimination or preference, . . . " while article 
XVI, § 5 provides: "Neither the Legislature, nor any 
county, city and county, township, school district, or other 
municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or 
pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or 
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian 
purpose whatever. . . . " and article IX, § 8 states:: "No 
public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of 
any sectarian or denominational school, and any school not 
under the exclusive control of the officers of the public 
schools." 
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government aid violated the constitution, asking first if 
the benefit derived from the program was direct or indirect 
and second, if the aid was substantial or incidental. Id. 
at 962; Sands, 809 P.2d 809 (Mosk, J. concurring). Applying 
the first prong of this test, the Court concluded that 
providing textbooks to children supports both the students 
and the school, thus, the program impermissibly benefits the 
sectarian school. Id. at 962-963. Under the second prong, 
the Court found that text books, unlike fire protection, 
advance the central objective of the sectarian schools — 
education of children. Id. at 963. The Court avidly 
rejected the assumption that secular texts would be used for 
secular instruction only. Id. at 963-964. 
Two California cases, Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 
P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978), and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 
Cal.App.3d 566 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989) deliberated the 
constitutionality of government sponsored religious 
displays. In Fox, the California Supreme Court held that 
under article I, § 4 , government may not prefer one religion 
over another and may not appear to act prefer-entially. 
Fox, 587 P.2d at 665-666. Although for 30 years a cross had 
been illuminated on the Los Angeles City Hall without 
citizen complaint, the Court rejected the argument that the 
public did not perceive the display as a preference by the 
city. Id. (silence on the part of the religious minority 
does not represent disinterest). Because other holiday 
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symbols were included in the display challenged in Okrand, 
an unlit Menorah in the city hall was not a violation of the 
"no preference" clause. Okrand. 207 Cal.App.3d at 574. 
Oregon, too, has declared graduation prayers unconsti-
tutional on the basis of a no-aid provision31 in the state 
constitution. Kay v. David Douglas School District No. 40, 
719 P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd and dismissed for lack of 
justiciability, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987). In KaY, the 
Oregon Court interpreted the prohibition of article I, § 5 
strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher 
offering the prayer volunteered her times 
The fact that money spent on the preparation and 
delivery of the invocation was not apportioned and 
identified as a "line item" in the budget does not 
take it out of the proscription of section 5, 
which prohibits the spending of any money for the 
benefit of any religious or theological 
institution. 
Id. at 878 (emphasis original). Declining to conclude 
whether, by itself, the minimal expense was unconsti-
tutional, the court declared that the "wall of separation 
between church and state" mandated by the provision was also 
breached. Id. When taken as a whole, the court held 
Article I, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution states: 
No money shall be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of any 
religious [sic] or theological 
institution, nor shall any money be 
appropriated for the payment of any 
religious [sic] services in either house 
of the Legislative Assembly. 
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section 5 forbids "far more" than just direct payments in 
support of a religious institution. !£. at 878. 
These cited cases show the inclination of state courts 
to interpret state constitutional provisions independently 
of federal law and to uphold the stricter separation of 
government and religion often mandated in these states. 
Again, the law of Utah's sister states confirms the 
Society's claims in this case. For example, applying the 
reasoning of the California Court to this case indicates 
that article I, § 4 would allow incidental benefits to 
religious institutions in Salt Lake City such as fire 
protection and waste removal. These benefits are incidental 
to broad programs insuring the safety and welfare of all 
city inhabitants. Alternatively, an expenditure which 
directly aids religious worship like the funding of prayer 
at City Council meetings is unlawful. The encouragement and 
financing of City Council prayer is aimed bluntly at 
religious worship. The benefit to religious worship — the 
encouragement of prayer — is not an incidental by-product 
of a program with other lofty societal goals.32 
32
 An incidental benefit theory should not be confused 
with the Lemon secular purpose or effect test. The former 
analysis is concerned with a challenged practice that 
benefits religious practice insignificantly and indirectly 
as part of a broad program. The latter test, however, does 
not look at the manner in which the religious practice is 
benefitted, but the character of the practice itself. The 
questions pertinent to the Lemon inquiry are whether the 
practice primarily has a religious purpose or effect. The 
California Court was not concerned with whether prayer or 
text books for religious schools had secular purposes or 
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III. Although this Court Has Yet To Fully Interpret the 
Extensive Guarantees of article I, § 4, Existing Case Law 
Confirms the Unconstitutionality of the City Council. 
The detailed language of article I, § 4 has not gone 
unnoticed by this Court. Recognizing that the provision 
mandated constitutional guarantees more complete and more 
specific than those of federal establishment law, Justice 
Crockett insisted: 
Section 4, article I# of the Utah Constitution . . 
. is more articulate and express in assuring 
religious liberty and prohibiting discrimination, 
or church interference with private or public 
rights, than the generality of the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973) 
(Crockett, J.# concurring). This Court has not had the 
opportunity to develop an analysis premised upon the 
protections specified in the provision — the principles 
have only been applied generally in the few reported 
cases.33 
effects beyond their religious purposes and effects. 
Instead, the Court was concerned if the aid to religious 
practices and institutions were more than indirect and 
negligible. This, the Court found to be true. Again, no 
argument concerning secular purposes and effects is relevant 
to analysis under California Constitution nor should it be 
relevant to this Court's analysis. 
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 While this Court has not had the opportunity to deal 
at length with article 1, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, the 
Court has developed a body of state law based on other 
unique provisions of the state constitution. For example, 
in KUTV. Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983), the Court 
undertook the interpretation of article 1, § 15 of the Utah 
Constitution even though the issue before the court could 
have been concluded under federal law. Noting that the 
provision had never been authoritatively interpreted, the 
Court took on the task, surveying discussion of the 
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Twice in 1948, this Court resolved challenges under the 
state's no-aid provision. In Gubler v. Ut. State Teachers' 
Retirement. 192 P.2d 580 (Utah 1948), the Court upheld a 
retirement plan which allowed public school teachers to 
receive credit for years spent teaching in private schools. 
Since the program enticed experienced teachers away from 
private schools and gave them retirement credit after they 
had joined the public school system, the Court held that the 
scheme did not involve the appropriation of public funds for 
religious instruction. Id. at 585-587. However, the Court 
carefully pointed out that f,no public money or property has 
been appropriated or is being applied to any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction. We fail to see how the 
amendment in any way breaches the wall between church and 
state." id. at 587 (emphasis added).34 
provision at the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 518-519. 
Because the intent of the authors was not forthcoming from 
delegative history, the Court turned for guidance to the 
judicial decisions — especially those prior to the 1895 
Convention — in states with constitution provisions similar 
to Utah's. Id. After lengthy analysis of these cases, the 
Court concluded that although freedom of the press was not 
intended to be absolute or superior to other constitutional 
guarantees, the delegates and voters who framed the and 
adopted article 1, § 15 intended the provision to be "at 
least as protective of [freedom of the press] as the First 
Amendment." Id. at 521. 
34
 Interestingly, the City Council quotes this same 
passage to support its contention that article I, § 4 is 
somehow limited to "an anti-establishment provision 
prohibiting the creation of an institutional church." 
Appellants' Brief at 36. While article I, § 4 is certainly 
an anti-establishment provision, its protections are 
specific, prohibiting the expenditure of public funds in 
support of religious worship and exercise. The Gubler Court 
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On similar grounds, this Court refused to enjoin the 
use of state funds for the construction of a memorial 
building by an historical society, the Daughter of Utah 
Pioneers. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers. 197 P.2d 
477 (Utah 1948). The Court declared that without "positive 
evidence of the efforts on the part of [the] society to 
favor any particular religion,,f it would assume that the 
ultimate character of the project would be secular. Id. at 
489 (emphasis original). Because the group was a non-
religious , historical society, the Court did not need to 
test Utah's no-aid provision — the appropriation would not 
benefit an "ecclesiastical establishment." Id. 
In 1973, this Court sustained a plan for municipal aid 
for the construction of a hospital by a church corporation. 
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1973). How-
ever, the scheme was found to be constitutional because 
extensive regulations in the lease explicitly prevented 
religious activities in the hospital and would reduce or 
eliminate any incidental governmental benefits to a 
religious institution. Id. at 551-552.35 
clearly recognized this, insisting that the retirement plan 
did not violate the no-aid provision. Gubler, 192 P.2d at 
587. The City Council characterization of the provision is 
unpersuasive. 
35
 The lease provided "that there will be no chapels or 
other religious rooms set aside at the hospital and there 
will be no religious symbols or plaques contained therein; 
that the name of the hospital shall not contain a reference 
to any religious denomination; that no proselyting by any 
religious sect or distribution of literature, books, 
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Although these cases do not interpret article I, § 4 in 
the context of government prayer, they lay the foundation of 
analysis appropriate for this case. This Court was 
persuaded by the direct language of article I, § 4 to 
examine whether a proposed expenditure will benefit a 
religious institution or practice. The Court demonstrated 
that the Gubler retirement plan advantaged teachers only 
after they became public school teachers, that the Thomas 
appropriation would benefit a secular institution with 
secular purposes, and that the Manning hospital was stripped 
of any religious purpose as funded. Importantly, when the 
challenged expenditure was intended to fund a project under 
the direction of an non-governmental institution this Court 
assumed that the money would not be used for religious 
worship or exercise. For example, rather than doubt the 
intentions of the pioneer society, the Thomas Court assumed 
in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the purpose of 
the memorial was secular. To determine otherwise would be 
speculating on the future actions of the pioneer society. 
Similarly, given the provisions of the lease to insure that 
the hospital would be non-religious, the Court was assumed 
that the hospital's future activities would be secular. 
In contrast, in the case of the Salt Lake City 
Council's prayer policy, there is no question as to the 
brochures, symbols or other activities relating to or being 
of a proselyting nature shall be in said hospital." 
Manning, 517 P.2d at 551. 
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results of the challenged expenditures. This case does not 
involve appropriations to fund a future non-religious 
project. Instead, this case involves direct funding, by the 
government, of religious worship in which the government is 
a participant. Any uncertainty of intent and purpose is 
removed. The City Council's practice directly involves the 
government in religious worship as a result of the 
appropriations. By encouraging prayer at its meetings, the 
City Council has supplied the "positive evidence" of 
religious aid not found in Thomas.36 Unlike the hospital 
lease of Manning. there is no scheme to insure that the 
expenditure will not support religion — the City Council is 
powerless to dictate the content of the prayers to be given 
and is enmeshed in the religious aid avoided by the lease 
stipulations. And by planning for and presenting prayers as 
part of their opening ceremonies, the City Council uses 
public funds to directly support the religious practice of 
prayer, a situation not found in Gubler. 
36
 Religious favoritism is evident, not only when one 
religion or sect is preferred over another, but also when a 
particular religious practice — in this case, public prayer 
— is sanctioned or encouraged. 
The support of public government prayer, offensive to 
some religious denominations, evinces support of religion in 
general and yet inherently offenses certain religious 
denominations. 
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In addition, no questions remain as to the nature of 
City Council prayer as religious worship.37 The City 
Council failed to explain away the clearly religious 
ramifications of the prayers offered at its meetings. As 
the comments of two defendants indicate, the City Council's 
prayer is offered for religious purposes.38 Attempting to 
minimize the inherently religious nature of the public 
prayer, defendants' Opening Ceremonies Policy terms prayer 
as "non-denominational11. But compare the clear 
denominational prayer offered on September 10, 1991 which 
caused this suit. 
Similarly, defendants now attempt to disguise or 
confuse prayer as a secular practice by comparing it to 
references to God such as those on coins or in the Pledge of 
Allegiance. However, the City Council's active encourage-
ment of public prayers is vastly different from a passive 
reference to God on filthy lucre or in historical documents 
such as the Preamble to the Utah Constitution. Due to their 
widespread and almost reflexive use, such mottos and other 
37
 Prayer is: Attempted intercourse with God, with or 
without the mediation of priests or heavenly beings; it is 
usually, but not necessarily, vocal. It is designed by 
means of the creation of personal contact to affect the 
nature and course of the relationship. Its means and ends 
always depend on how the nature of God is conceived. 
Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible, Copyright 1962, 
11th Printing, 1980, Abingdon, Vol. 3, p. 857. 
38
 See footnotes 6, 7 & 16 above. 
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rote public references to divinity have lost any true 
religious significance. See Marsh v, Chambers. 463 U.S. 
783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The City 
Council's explanations cannot hide the purposes, effects and 
expectations surrounding a prayer. Prayer is different than 
the depersonalized and non-religious acknowledgement of God 
in daily public affairs. Despite defendants' efforts to 
confuse the scared with the profane, the two remain 
decidedly distinct. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the language of her Constitution, Utah has a 
unique obligation to its citizens. State law mandates 
uncompromising separation of government and religion and 
bans public funds use for religious purposes. Utah's 
citizens are guaranteed the right not to have taxes spent on 
religious exercises, the right to have a government free 
from non-secular influences and the right to complete 
religious autonomy. These added guarantees comprise what 
the authors of Utah's Constitution thought to be necessary 
"to secure and perpetuate the principles of free government. 
. . .
w
 Preamble, Utah Const. Far from redundances, these 
words set forth absolute law which Utah governmental 
officials are duty bound to follow. 
If necessary to search in other jurisdictions for 
guidance, this Court can consider the sincere effort of 
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sister states to secure the full extent of the rights and 
liberties owed to their citizens. Provisions in other state 
constitutions similar to article I, $ 4 have been found to 
be absolute prohibitions against expenditure of any 
governmental money to aid or encourage prayers. 
Although limited, Utah case law interpreting article I, 
§ 4 also supports a constitutional ban on City Council 
prayer. To plan for and present prayer involves the 
appropriation of public funds to allow city officials to 
engage in religious worship. To the City Council's 
purposes, tax revenues are unlawfully appropriated for the 
religious exercise and the strict separ-ation of church and 
state is breached. Given the clear mandate of article I, § 
4, the City Council's practice cannot stand. 
Article I, $ 4 needs no more analysis. Interpretative 
appeals to delegative history are dubious — if not unsound 
— when a constitutional provision is clearly worded. How-
ever, an interpretation of the Utah framer's original and 
real intent gives even more force to the Society's 
arguments. The pioneers of Utah were especially sensitive 
to the issues between church and state. Many of them 
victims of religious persecution sanctioned by the states of 
Illinois and Missouri, these individuals held particular 
respect for the differing religious choices of the people of 
their state. They were particularly aware of the dangers of 
religious factionalism and violence which can accompany 
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state involvement with religion. Many of Utah's pioneer 
inhabitants were treated as outcasts from the nation because 
of their religious affiliation. They wanted to ensure that 
in their new state, no one would feel isolated from their 
government because the government was contributing to a 
religious practice with which they did not agree. And so, 
with more fortitude and experience than the framers of the 
United States Bill of Rights, these Utahns determined that 
religious freedom and perfect tolerance require that the 
government not aid or otherwise put its stamp of approval on 
any religion or on religion in general. To protect these 
values, the people of Utah anticipated a need for a great 
and strong wall between church and state and a prohibition 
against public funding of religious exercise. Thus, they 
clearly wrote and then ratified article I, § 4. 
The City Council's practice of government sponsored 
prayers violate the Utah Constitution. The decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council 
Defendants. 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civ i l No. 91-090-6136 
J.D. FREDERICK (Hon. ) 
PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against defendants 
RONALD WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, 
TOM GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and TOM HALE, members of the Salt 
Lake City Council, state and allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland 
non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah. 
One of the corporate goals of the Society and the Utah 
Chapter of the Society is to preserve and maintain the 
separation of church and state as required by the Utah 
Constitution (Art. I, § 4). 
2. The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists, 
Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and 
taxpayers of the State of Utah including Salt Lake City and 
Salt Lake County. 
3. J. Walker is a resident of the County of Salt Lake. 
J. Walker is a taxpayer and has for many years paid various 
taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Count and Salt Lake City. 
4. Richard Andrews is a resident of the County of Salt 
Lake. Richard Andrews is a taxpayer and has for many years 
paid various taxes (income, property, sales, etc.) to the 
State of Utah, Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City* Richard 
Andrews has personally and on behalf of the Society of 
Separationists, Inc. protested to the Salt Lake City Council 
against their practice of prayers before City Council 
meetings. Richard Andrews is Co-Chair of the Utah Chapter of 
the Society of Separationists, Inc. 
5. The defendants RONALD WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and TOM 
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HALE, are the duly elected and serving members of the Salt 
Lake City Council. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
6. Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . There shall be no 
union of Church and State, nor shall 
any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
7. For several years and currently, the defendants 
conduct prayers at the commencement of the meetings of the 
Salt Lake City Council. 
8. The prayer recited at the commencement of the 
September 10, 1991 Salt Lake City Council meeting by a 
Chaplain of the Salt Lake City Police Department. That 
prayer was as follows: 
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful 
this night to be able to meet in this 
forum and we ask Thee to bless those 
who participate, that their minds will 
be clear and decisions will be made 
that will be fair and equitable to the 
citizens of the city. We are grateful 
for our government. We are grateful 
for the land we hold. Father, we are 
grateful for the safe return of our 
troops from the Gulf. We ask these 
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. 
Amen. 
9. Although requested orally and in writing to cease 
said practice, the defendants have declined to do so. 
10. The defendants' inclusion of prayers in City 
Council meetings results in the expenditure of public funds, 
assets and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation. City 
facilities (meeting rooms, etc.), city equipment 
(microphones, podiums, stages, etc.), city resources 
(electricity, printing of programs, etc.) and city employees' 
time (in supervising, attending, etc.) are used and expended 
in programming, witnessing, and/or reciting said prayers. 
Said funds, assets and resources of Salt Lake City 
Corporation are utilized to aid in the recitation of said 
prayers with the knowledge, approval, concurrence and 
ratification of the defendants. 
11. The allowance and/or inclusion of prayers in City 
Council meetings results in the expenditure and application 
of public funds, assets and resources of the defendant for 
religious worship and exercise. 
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12. The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and 
restrained by this Court, the defendants will continue to 
expend public funds as set forth above in violation of Art. 
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
13. The actions of the defendants in allowing prayers 
in the past and in the future as set forth above was and will 
be in violation of the provisions of Art. I# § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
14. Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 
as amended) the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory 
judgment to the effect that the expenditure by the defendants 
of City funds and resources for said prayers is in violation 
of the provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
15. The plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent 
injunction to end the expenditure by the defendants of funds 
and resources for said prayers is in violation of the pro-
visions of Art. I, S 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request the following relief: 
1. A preliminary and a permanent injunction against 
the defendants, their agents and employees prohibiting them 
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from expending any public funds, resources or property in 
support of prayers at City Council meetings. 
2. A preliminary and a permanent injunction against 
the defendants, their agents and employees prohibiting them 
from allowing or having prayers at City Council meetings. 
3. Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 
as amended), a declaratory judgment to the effect that the 
past expenditure by the defendants of funds and the use of 
its resources as set forth above was in violation of the 
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
4. Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred 
herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper in the premises. 
DATED this 26th day of SEPTEMBER, 1991. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BRIAN fL. BARNARD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT to: 
ROGER CUTLER 
Attorney for Defendants 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING 
WASHINGTON SQUARE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 26TH day of SEPTEMBER, 1991, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BMB/SOSSLC. C0M/LIT3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 910906136 
The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
in the instant action. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this 
Court that the City Councils practice of including, for a 
number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part of its 
opening ceremonies, violates Article I, Section 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
This Court, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Brief on behalf of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Utah, Inc. 
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Oral arguments on the respective motions were heard 
February 21, 1991. 
OPERATIVE FACTS 
1. The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative 
and executive functions of the city government into a 
commission form of government. Prayer was not usually offered 
during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979. 
2. In 1980, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq.f Utah 
Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong 
Mayor form of government. This form of government strictly 
separates the executive and legislative functions. The 
executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with 
the legislative functions reserved to the City Council. 
3. At its first meeting on January 8, 1980, the City 
Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which 
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. From January 
15, 1980 until October 15 , 1987, the proceedings of the City 
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered 
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting. 
4. In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City 
Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council 
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that pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) , 
opening ceremonies including prayerful invocations were 
constitutionally permissible. 
5. Beginning on May 17, 1988, the City Council 
reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the 
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings. Prayers were not 
said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987 
through May 17, 1988. Defendants acknowledge that the practice 
of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and 
invocations. 
6. On October 17, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2. 
7. The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that 
as part of an opening ceremony, the City Council will hear 
various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning 
certain legislative sessions. Contrary to the formally adopted 
City Council Policy, at least two of the defendant City Council 
members acknowledge that prayers and invocations before the 
City Council have always been offered and will continue to be 
offered for religious purposes. Yet, the City Council Policy 
specifies that the offering of these thoughts, readings and 
invocations is for a number of secular purposes. These 
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment 
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect 
on the business before the Council; the promotion of an 
atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and 
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the 
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness 
of all segments of our community. 
8. The Council Policy expresses a preference for 
non-denominational and non-proselyting opening ceremony 
presentations. Presentation of the opening ceremony is 
coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain. Pursuant to 
the Policy, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make 
arrangements to give their opening presentation. The 
presenters are not compensated in any way. 
9. Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in 
the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that 
would offer prayers at the City Council meetings. He 
indicated that the City has an extensive mailing list of 
churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact 
the City to offer prayers. 
10. Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the 
City Council,s desire and goal to have non-denominational 
prayers has not been successful. 
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11. Defendant Council member Nancy Pace on October 17, 
1991 stated with regard to the defendant's recently enacted 
Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings, flI don't 
believe that what we're doing [offering prayers] could be 
construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in 
court." 
12. On September 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department: 
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this 
night to be able to meet in this forum and 
we ask Thee to bless those who participate, 
that their minds will be clear and decisions 
will be made that will be fair and equitable 
to the citizens of the City. We are 
grateful for our government. We are 
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we 
are grateful for the safe return of our 
troops from the Gulf. We ask these 
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen. 
13. Although requested orally and in writing to cease said 
practice, the defendants have declined to do so. 
14. Defendants admit that "existing city facilities, 
assets and a small amount of time" are used in conducting the 
invocations. The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings 
results in the expenditure of public funds, assets and 
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resources of Salt Lake City Corporation. City facilities 
(meeting rooms, etc.)/ City equipment (microphones, podiums, 
stages, etc.), City resources (electricity, printing of 
programs, etc.), and City employees7 time (in supervising, 
attending, etc.), are used and expended in programming, 
witnessing and/or reciting said prayers. Said funds, assets 
and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid 
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval, 
concurrence and ratification of the defendants. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs have sought Summary Judgment against the 
defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prciyers and 
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in 
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by 
defendants of funds and resources in violation of the 
prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution 
establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent 
on a religious exercise, the right to a government free of 
sectarian influence or control, and the right to entertain 
their own religious ideas free of state intrusions. These 
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guarantees of religious autonomy and absolute separation of 
church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered 
by the United States Constitution. In expanding the rights of 
its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly 
and separately rejects the practice of praying before 
legislative meetings. 
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding 
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to 
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
this Court should decide the issue presented the way it has 
been decided by the United States Supreme Court in the matter 
of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in that such 
traditional prayers are, under specified circumstances, 
acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an 
establishment of religion. It is argued by the defendants that 
the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for 
specified secular purposes at "legislative" sessions is 
acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 
Utah. Furthermore, it is argued, the expenditures are de 
minimus. 
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent 
part declares: 
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The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The state shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . . 
There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State, or 
interfere with its functions. No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . . 
No prior Utah Supreme Court cases have specifically 
interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as 
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or 
invocations at city council or legislative meetings. Moreover, 
none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point. 
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to 
examine decisions from other state courts which have 
interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions. 
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states: 
No money shall be drawn from the treasury 
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or 
theological institution, nor shall any money 
be appropriated for the payment of any 
religeous [sic] services in either house of 
the Legislative assembly. 
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This provision was interpreted by the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in the matter of Kay v. Douglas School District, 719 
P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986). The Oregon court interpreted the 
prohibition of public expenditure on religious institutions 
strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher in a 
public school had scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered 
time. The court held, as follows: 
The fact that money spent on the preparation 
and delivery of the invocation was not 
apportioned and identified as a "line item" 
in the budget does not take it out of the 
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits 
the spending of any money for the benefit 
of any religious or theological institution. 
Id. at 878. (Emphasis original) 
In the matter of Sands v. Moronao Unified School District, 
809 P.2d 809, at 836 (Cal. 1991), three members of the 
California Supreme Court determined that governmental support 
and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state 
and federal constitutions. 
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the 
prayers acceptable, insisting that a practice is 
unconstitutional "when it appears to place the government's 
stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice, 
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such as public prayer." Id. at 816. Article XVI, Section 5, 
of the California Constitution provides: 
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, 
city and county, township, school district, 
or other municipal corporation, shall ever 
make an appropriation, or pay from any 
public fund whatever, or grant anything to 
or in aid of any religious sect, church, 
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . . 
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that, lf[S]tate courts are 
and should be, the first line of defense for individual 
liberties....11 Id. at 836. Two additional judges of the 
California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that 
the practice involved violated the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, declined to reach the issue of 
whether or not the practice involved violated the California 
Constitution. The remaining two judges determined there was no 
violation. 
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution 
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution, 
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the 
United States Constitution. Instead, as asserted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the state constitution embodies certain of the 
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and 
expounds on these in greater detail: 
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[P]rovision of Section 4, Article I, of the 
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate 
and express in assuring religious liberty 
and prohibiting discrimination, or church 
interference with private or public rights, 
than the generality of the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, at 
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring). 
One scholar has observed: 
Compared to the brief and almost 
enigmatic statement on religion in the 
federal constitution, the Utah 
constitution's provisions seem prolix 
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection 
for religious freedom and injunction against 
the union of church and state has been 
included. 
[T]he union of church and state is 
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations 
of public money or property to "any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment" are proscribed. 
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State 
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1966). 
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory 
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a 
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, 
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary. In Rampton 
v. Barlow. 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held 
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision 
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was clear, no resort to assumed intent was necessary* 
w[I]ntent is to be found from the instrument itself; and when 
the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the 
courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to 
search for its meaning beyond the instrument." Hines v. 
Winters. 320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957)e 
To get at the thought or meaning expressed 
in a statute. ..or a Constitution, the first 
resort, in all cases, is to the natural 
signification of the words.... If the words 
convey a definite meaning which involves no 
absurdity, nor any contradiction of other 
parts of the instrument, then that meaning, 
apparent on the face of the instrument, must 
be accepted and neither the courts nor the 
Legislature have the right to add to it or 
take from it. 
Shaw v. Grumbie. 278 P. 311 (Okla. 1929) 
Where there exists no ambiguity in the language of the 
document to be interpreted, and the interpretation therefore is 
not doubtful, there is little reason to resort to factors 
outside the words themselves for the meaning of the provision. 
In this instance, the constitutional provision in question 
is unambiguous and capable of ready interpretation. The 
unequivocal, unconditional pronouncements of Article I, Section 
4 leave little room for clarification and interpretation. 
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It is this Court's obligation to make every reasonable 
presumption in favor of constitutionality, and this Court will 
not nullify legislative enactments unless it is clear and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v, Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc, 564 P.2d 751, 753 
(Utah 1977). A legislative enactment is presumed to be valid 
and in conformity with the constitution. For purposes of this 
decision, the defendants7 adopted Policy is treated as 
"legislative" action, though there is some doubt. It should 
not be held to be invalid unless it has been shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some particular 
constitutional provision. Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 
1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, den., 425 U.S. 915 (1976). 
The language of the Utah Constitution sets forth the 
absolute law which Utah governmental officials are bound to 
follow. 
By encouraging, supporting, allowing or condoning religious 
worship before its sessions, the Council is enmeshed in 
non-secular entanglements. By planning for and presenting 
public prayers as part of their opening ceremonies, the City 
Council uses public funds to aid and support the religious 
practice of prayer. 
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Government prayer does involve the expenditure of public 
funds. The City Council has spent time and money to develop 
guidelines for those offering invocations. The Council members 
and City employees are paid to observe and be solemnized by the 
exercise. City employees must schedule and arrange for the 
attendance of the person offering prayer. Moreover, the 
facilities intended for use of the City are appropriated for 
the actual presentation of prayer. Such expenditures contrary 
to the argument of defendants, are not de minimus, but on the 
contrary, represent a serious threat to constitutionally 
protected rights. The Constitution of Utah dictates in clear 
and bold terms that religious exercise must be separate from 
the functions of government. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in 
the Memoranda in support of the plaintifffs requested relief, 
the plaintiff's Summary Judgment is granted as prayed. 
Defendant's cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare the appropriate Orders. 
Dated this f» ^ ^av of March, 1992, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council 
Defendants. 
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ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 91-090-6136 CV 
(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parties7 mutual 
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by 
Brian M. Barnard and defendants being represented by Roger 
Cutler, the Court having reviewed the file and all of the 
pleadings therein, the matter having been argued and 
submitted and the court now being fully advised in the 
premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set out in 
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision 
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts 
in dispute, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is denied; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is granted; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a 
declaratory judgment to the effect that the past expenditures 
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in 
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice 
of defendants and Salt Lake City in having or allowing 
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City 
Council violate Art, I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution; 
further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently 
prohibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers 
recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City Council and they 
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are permanently enjoined and prohibited from expending public 
funds, resources or property to support or encourage such 
prayers; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs are awarded a judgment against defendants for 
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
one hundred three dollars ($103.00). 
DATED this Of « M « , 1992. 
BY TH2 COTOT: 
QEP'STl'C 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE: POST 
DECISION MATTERS 
Civil No. 91-090-6136 CV 
(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
on the defendants' Motion for Clarification and defendants' 
Objection to the Proposed Summary Judgment Order submitted by 
plaintiff, the Court having reviewed the arguments, the file 
and the pleadings therein and being fully advised in the 
premises, based thereon and for good cause appearing and for 
the reasons set out in plaintiffs' reply memorandums, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants' Motion for Clarification of the Court's ruling 
and memorandum decision of March 2, 1992 should be and hereby 
is denied; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants/ Objections to the proposed Summary Judgment Order 
should be and hereby are overruled; said Summary Judgment 
Order was signed and entered by the Court on April 9, 1992. 
DATED this day of APRIL, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
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Professor of Law 
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Los Angeles, California 
1992 
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M Book* 
App. 4A. State Texts Relating to Religion1 
Research Note: 
State constitutions treat religion much more specifically and elabor-
ately than do the comparatively terse free exercise and establishment 
clauses of the federal first amendment. Indiana has seven clauses 
relevant to freedom of religion and conscience in its Bill of Rights 
alone. Particularized state provisions include, among many others, 
clauses making bigamy and polygamy a crime (Idaho Const, art. I, 
§ 4; Okla. Const, art. I, § 2) and Wisconsin's clause on the public 
transportation of children to and from parochial schools (Wis. Const, 
art. I, § 21). The Louisiana and Montana Bills of Rights even prohibit 
non-governmental discrimination against religious beliefs or ideas (La. 
Const, art I, § 12; Mont Const, art. n, § 4). 
The researcher should not limit the search to a state's Bill of Rights 
alone. State constitutional limitations on financial aid to religion or 
sectarian schools, for example, are often placed outside of the Bill 
of Rights, in sections relating to public finance or to education. 
Miscellaneous provisions touching upon religion may be scattered 
throughout the constitution, including in its preamble. 
Finally, some state clauses, if literally applied, are likely inconsistent 
with interpretations of the first amendment. See. e.g., Md. Decl. of 
Rights arts. 36, 37 (disqualifying atheists from public office) and 
Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S. Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 
(1961) (exclusion from public office of persons who did not believe 
in Supreme Being violated federal Constitution); Miss. Const, art. 3, 
§ 18 (use of Bible in public schools permitted); Va. Const. artc I, § 16 
("[I]t is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, 
and charity toward each other."); Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. 3 (observance 
of Sabbath); see also Walter v. West Virginia, 610 R Supp. 1169 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1985) (constitutional amendment XVa, requiring moment of 
silence at beginning of school day, violated the first amendment). 
1
 These tables build on citations collected in Fritz, Religion in a Federal System: 
Diversity Versus Uniformity, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 39 (1989); Collins, Bills and Declara-
tions of Rights Digest, in The Amencan Bench 2500 (3d ed. 1985/1986), and other 
sources. 
(Matthew Bender & Co, lnc) ^ ' (Pub649) 
S T A T E CONSTITUTIONAL LAW App. 4A-2 
L PROHIBITIONS ON ESTABLISHMENT AND 
PREFERENCE 
A. Representative Clauses: 
1. "The state shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.*' 
Mont. Const, art. II, § 5. 
2. "There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in prefer-
ence to another." 
N.J. Const, art. 1, § 4. 
3. "No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious 
society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to 
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry, against his consent." 
Ind. Const, art. I, § 4 (as amended 1984). 
B. State by State Listings: 
1. Establishment clause similar to federal. 
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Alaska Const, art. 1, § 4; 
Cal. Cons' »* 1. § 4; 
Fla. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Haw. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Iowa Const art. I, § 3; 
La. Const, art. I, § 8; 
Md. Decl. of Rights art. 36, cl. 3 (ambiguous, as not addressed by 
legislation); 
Mont. Const, art. n, § 5; 
S.C. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4. 
2. No-preference Clause. 
Ala. Const, art I, § 3; 
Aric. Const, art. II, § 24; 
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Cal. Const, art. 1, § 4; 
Colo. Const, art. n, § 4; 
Conn. Const, art. VII, cl. 2; 
Del. Const, art. I, § 1; 
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4; 
El. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ind. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7; 
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights § 5; 
Me. Const, arte I, § 3; 
Mass. Const, amend., art. XI; 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16; 
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18; 
Mo. Const, art I, § 7; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4; 
N.H. Const, pt. 1, art. 6; 
NJ. Const, art. I, § 4; 
N.M. Const, art. n, § 11; 
N.Y. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Nev< Const, art. 1, § 4; 
N.D. Const, art. 1, § 3; 
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7; 
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Va. Const, art. I, § 16; 
W. Va. Const, art. m, § 15; 
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18; 
Wyo. Const, art. I, § 18. 
3. Neither an Establishment Qause nor a No-preference Clause. 
(Matthew Bender & Co.. Inc.) (Pub.649) 
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Arizona 
Georgia 
Michigan 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Rhode 1:1^: 
Vermont 
Washington 
4. Ban on religious or sectarian control of publicly funded schools, 
or religious indoctrination in public schools. 
Alaska Const, art. VII, § 1; 
Ariz. Const, art XX, § 7; 
Cal. 
Const, art. K, §§ 8, 9(f); 
Colo. Const, art. IX, § 8; 
Haw. Const, art. X, § 1; 
Idaho Const, art. IX, § 6; 
Kan. Const, art. 6, § 6(c); 
Mont. Const, art. X, § 7; 
Neb. Const, art. VII, § 11; 
Nev. Const, art. 11, §§ 2, 9; 
N.M. Const, art. XH, § 3; 
N.D. Const art. VIE, § 5; 
Ohio Const, art VI, § 2; 
Okla. Const, art. I, § 5; 
S.D. Const, art. Vm, § 16; 
Utah Const, art. HI, c. 4; 
Wash. Const, art. IX, § 4; 
Wis. Const, art. X, § 6; 
Wyo. Const, art. 7, § 12. 
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5. Clauses accommodating religion in public schools or allowing for 
release of students to study during school hours. 
Mich. Const, art. Vm, § 1; 
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4; 
N.C. Const, art. DC, § 1; 
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7; 
Wis. Const, art. X, § 3. 
II. NO FINANCIAL AID TO RELIGION 
A. Representative Clauses: 
1. " . . . No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or 
agency thereof shall ever be paid from the public treasury directly or 
indirectly in aid on any church, sect, or religious denomination or in 
aid of any sectarian institution." 
Fla. Const, art. I, § 3. 
2. "Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, town-
ship, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make 
an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant 
anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian 
purpose . . .." 
Cal. Const, art. XVI, § 5. 
3. "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the 
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence." 
Wash. Const, art. IX, § 4. 
B. State by State Listings: 
1. I>u compulsory individual contributions (support). 
Ala. Const art. I, § 3; 
Ark. Const, art. II, § 24; 
Cal. Const, art. XVI, § 5; art. K , § 8; 
Colo. Const, art. II, § 4; 
Conn. Const, art. VH, cl. 1; 
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Del. Const, art. I, § 1; 
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4; 
111. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 4; 
Iowa Const, art. I, § 3; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7; 
Ky. Const. § 5; 
Md. Bill of Rights, Decl. of Rights, art. 36, cl. 1; 
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16; 
Mo. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Neb. Const art. I, § 4; 
N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 6; 
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3; 
N.M. Const, art. H, § 11; 
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7; 
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3; 
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3; 
Va. Const, art. I, § 16; 
W. Va. Const, art m, § 15; 
Wis. Const art. I, § 18. 
2. No gifts, funds or appropriations to churches, religious schools, 
or religious institutions. 
Ala. Const, art. XIV, § 263; 
Alaska Const, art. VII, § 1; 
Ariz. Const, art. II, § 12; 
Cal. Const, art. DC, § 8; 
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Colo. Const art. DC, § 7; 
Del. Const, art. X, § 3; 
Fla. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Gz. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Haw. Const, art. X, § 1; 
Idaho Const, art. K, § 5; 
111. Const, art. X, § 3; 
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 6; 
Kan. Const, art. 6, § 6(c); 
Ky. Const. § 189; 
Mass. Const amend, art. XVm, § 2; 
Mich. Const art. Vm, § 2; 
Minn. Const art. XDI, § 2; 
Miss. Const, art. 8, § 208; 
Mo. Const art. K, § 8; 
Mont Const, art. X, § 6(1); 
Neb. Const, art VII, § 11; 
N.H. Const pt II, art. 83; 
N.M. Const art. XII, § 3; 
N.Y. Const, art. XI, § 3; 
N.D. Const art. Vm, § 5; 
Or. Const, art. I, § 5; 
Pa. Const art. m, § 15; 
S.C. Const art. XI, § 4; 
SJD. Const art. VHIf § 16; 
Tex. Const, art. VII, § 5; 
Utah Const art X, § 9; 
Va. Const art Vm, § 10; 
Wash. Const art. I, § 11, art. IX § 4; 
Wyo. Const art. VE, § 8. 
3. Exemption for transportation, textbooks, or tuition loans or grants. 
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Colo. Const, art. XI, § 2a (loans); 
Del. Const, art. X, § 5 (transportation); 
La. Const, art. VIE, § 13 (textbooks); 
Mich. Ccr : art viU, § 2 (transportation); 
NJ. Const, an. vill, § 4, fl (transportation); 
N.Y. Const, art. XI, § 3 (transportation); 
Wis. Const, art. 1, § 23 (transportation); 
Va. Const, art. VIII, § 11 (loans or grants). 
4. No religious control of public educational funding. 
Kan. Bill of Rights art. 6, § 6; 
Miss. Const, art. 8, § 208; 
Ohio Const, art. VI, § 2. 
HI. FREEDOM OF EXERCISE, WORSHIP, AND 
CONSCIENCE 
A. Representative Clauses: 
1. "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that 
no man can of right be compelled to attend . . . any place of worship 
. . .; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or 
interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall 
ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of 
worship." 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3. 
2. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed, 
and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege 
or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion; but the 
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense 
with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or to justify 
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state. 
No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place 
of worship, religious sect, or denomination against his consent. Nor 
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination 
or mode of worship." 
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Colo, Const, art. n, § 4. 
3. "Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, 
and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on 
account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall 
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify 
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state . . .." 
Wash. Const, art. I, § 11. 
B. State by State Listing: 
1, Generally securing toleration of religious sentiment 
Ariz. Const, art XX, cl. 1; 
Idaho Const art. XXI, § 19; 
Nev. Const ordinance, cl. 2; 
NJil Const, art. XXI, § 1; 
NJD. Const art. Xm, § 1; 
Okla. Const, art I, § 2; 
SX>. Const art XXVI, § 18, cl. 1; 
Utah Const art. m, § 1; 
Wash. Const art. XXVI, § 1; 
Wyo, Const art. 21, § 25. 
2. No molestation in person or property for religious opinion. 
Ga. Const art I, § 1, f IV; 
Idaho Const art. XXI, § 19; 
Me. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Mass. Const, pt I, art. II; 
N.H. Const, pt. I, art 5; 
N.M. Const art. II, § 11; 
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2; 
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Va. Const art I, § 16; 
Wash. Const art. I, § 11; 
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W. Va. Const, art. ffl, § 15. 
3. Right to worship according to dictates of conscience. 
Ark. Const, art. II, § 24; 
Conn. Const, art. VII; 
Ga. Const, art I, § 1,1 m 
Ind. Const, an. 1, § 2; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7; 
Me. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Mass. Const, pt. I, art. II; 
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16; 
Mo. Const, art. I, § 5; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4; 
N.H. Const, pt. I, art 5; 
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3; 
N.M. Const, art. II, § 11; 
N.C. Const, art. I, § 13; 
Ohio Const art. I, § 7; 
Or. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3; 
R.I. Const art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4; 
Vt Const, ch. I, art. 3; 
Va. Const, art I, § 16; 
Wash. Const art. I, § 11; 
Wis. Const, art I, § 18. 
4. Freedom of "conscience" from official interference (some raise 
ambiguity whether secular conscience, in addition to religious con-
science, is protected). 
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Ariz. Const, art. n, § 12; 
Ark. Const, art. n, § 24; 
Cal. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Colo. Const, art. n, § 4; 
Del Const, art. I, § 1; 
Ga. Const, art I, § I, \ HI; 
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4; 
111. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 3; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7; 
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights §§ 1, 5; 
Me. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Mass. Const, pt. I, art. II; 
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Minn. Const, art I, § 16; 
Mo. Const, art. I, § 5; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Nev. Const, art. 1, § 4; 
N.H. Const, pt. I, arts. 4, 5; 
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3; 
N.M. Const, art H, § 11, and art. XXI, § 1; 
N.Y. Const, art. I, § 3; 
N.C. Const, art. I, § 13; 
N.D. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7; 
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Or. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3; 
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3; 
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Tex. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4; 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3; 
Va. Const, art. I, § 16; 
Wash. Const, art. I, § 11; 
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18; 
Wyo. Const, art. i, § 18. 
5. Forbidding discrimination against free exercise of religion, or 
based on religion. 
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Alaska Const, art. I, § 3; 
Cal Const, art. I, § 4; 
Colo. Const, art II, § 4; 
Conn. Const, art. I, § 20; 
Ha. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Ga. Const, art. I, § 1,1 IV; 
Haw. Const, art. I, § 5; 
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4; 
HI. Const, art. I, § 3; 
I?wa Const, art. I, § 4; 
K>. Const. § 5; 
La. Const art. I, § 3; 
Me. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Md. Decl. of Rights art. 36, cl. 1; 
Mich. Const art. I, § 2; 
Mont. Const, art. n, § 4; 
Nev. Const, art. 1, § 4; 
NJ. Const art. I, § 5; 
N.M. Const, art. II, § 11; 
N.Y. Const art. I, § 3; 
N.C. Const, art. I, § 19; 
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N.D. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2; 
Or. Const, art. I, § 3; 
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 3a; 
Utah Const art. HI, cl. 1; 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3; 
Va. Const, art, I, § 16; 
Wash, Const, art. XXVI, cl. 1; 
W. Va. Const, art. m, § 15; 
Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 18. 
6. Free exercise clause similar to federal. 
Alaska Const, art. I, § 4; 
Fla. Const art. I, § 3; 
Haw. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Iowa Const, art. I, § 3; 
La. Const, art. I, § 8; 
Mass. Const, amend, art. XVm, § 1; 
Mont. Const, art. n, § 5; 
S.C. Const art. 1, § 2; 
Utah Const art. 1, § 4. 
7. Rights to refrain—no one compelled to attend a place of worship. 
Ala. Const art. I, § 3; 
Ark. Const, art. II, § 24; 
Colo. Const, art. II, § 4; 
Conn. Const art. VII; 
Del. Const, art. I, § 1; 
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4 and art. K , § 6; 
HI. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 4; 
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Iowa Const, art. I, § 3; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7; 
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights, § 5; 
Md. Decl of Rights, art. 36, cl. 1; 
Mass. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. II; 
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4; 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16; 
Mo. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4; 
NJ. Const, art. n, § 3; 
N.M. Const, art. H, § 11; 
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7; 
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3; 
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3; 
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6; 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3; 
Va. Const, art. I, § 16; 
W. Va. Const, art. HI, § 15; 
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18. 
8. Rights to refrain from participation in religious services in public 
educational institutions. 
Colo. Const, art. DC, § 8; 
Idaho Const, art. DC, § 6; 
Mont. Const, art. X, § 7; 
N.M. Const, art. XII, § 9; 
Wyo. Const, art. VII, § 12. 
9. Exemption from state military duty on grounds of religious or 
conscientious scruples. 
Ark. Const, art. XI, § 1; (if federal law would exempt) Colo. Const 
art. XVH, § 5; 
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Fla. Const, art. X, § 2(a); (religious) 
Idaho Const, art. XIV, § 1; 
IlL Const, art. XII, § 1; (if federal law would exempt) 
Ind. Const, art. 12, § 4; (conscientious objectors) 
Iowa Const, art. VI, § 2; 
Kan. Const, art. 8, § 1; 
Ky. Const. § 220; 
Me. Const, art. VH, § 5; (religious) 
Mont. Const, art. VI, § 13(2); (if federal law would exempt) 
N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 13; 
N.M. Const, art. XVm, § 1; (if federal lav/ would exempt) 
N.D. Const art. XI, § 16; (religious) 
Or. Const, art X, § 2; (religious) 
Pa. Const, art. m, § 16; 
S.C. Const, art. XIII, § 1; (religious) 
S.D. Const, art. XV, § 7; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 28 and art. Vffl, § 3; 
Tex. Const art. 16, § 47; 
Utah Const, art. XV, § 1; (if federal law would exempt) 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 9; 
Wash. Const, art. X, § 6; 
Wyo. Const, art. 17, § 1. 
10. Religious exemption from state taxation. 
Ala. Const, art. IV, § 91, art. XH, § 229; 
Alaska Const, art. EX, § 4; 
Ariz. Const art. DC, § 2(1); 
Ark. Const, art. XVI, § 5; 
Cal. Const art. XDI, §§ 3(f), 4(b); 
Colo. Const, art. X, § 5; 
Fla. Const, art. VII, § 3(a); 
Ga. Const, art VII, § n, ^ 4; 
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III. Const, art. IX, § 6; 
Ind. Const, art. 10, § 1(a)(1); 
Kan. Const, art. 11, §§ 1(a), 1(b)(2); 
Ky. Const. § 170, 
La. Const, art. VII, § 21(B)(1); 
Mich. Const, art. DC, § 4; 
Minn. Const, art. X, § 1; 
Mo. Const, art. X, § 6; 
Mont. Const, art. VHI, § 5(l)(b); 
Neb. Const, art. Vm, § 2; 
Nev. Const, art. 8, § 2 and art. 10, § 1, H 8; 
NJ. Const, art. Vm, § 2; 
N.M. Const, art. VHI, § 3; 
N.Y. Const, art. XVI, § 1; 
N.D. Const art. X, § 5; 
Ohio Const, art. XII, § 2; 
Okla. Const, art. X, § 6; 
Pa. Const, art. Vm, § 2(a)(i); 
S.C. Const, art. X, § 3(c); 
S.D. Const, art. XI, § 6; 
Tenn. Const, art. n, § 28; 
Tex. Const, art. 8, § 2(a); 
Utah Const, art. XIH, § 2(2)(c); 
Va. Const, art. X, §§ 6(a)(2), 6(a)(6); 
W. Va. Const, art. X, § 1; 
Wyo. Const, art. 15, § 12. 
IV. NO RELIGIOUS TESTS OR QUALIFICATIONS 
A. Representative Clauses: 
1. "No religious test or property qualification shall be required for 
any office of public trust, nor for any vote at any election, nor shall 
any person be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief." 
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Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, art. 7. 
2. "No religious qualification shall be required for any public office 
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent .as a witness or 
juror in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion, nor be 
questioned touching his religious belief in any court of justice to affect 
the weight of his testimony." 
Ariz. Const, art. II, § 12. 
3. "No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the 
Courts of this State on account of his religious opinions, or for the 
want of any religious belief . . .." 
Tex. Const, art. I, § 5. 
4. ". . . [N]o religious test shall be required as a qualification for 
any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious 
belief or the absence thererof." 
Utah Const, art. 1, § 4. 
B. State by State Listing: 
No religious test or disqualification for public office or trust, juror, 
witness, right to vote, and/or admission to public schools. 
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3; 
Ariz. Const, art. n, § 12, and art. XI, § 7; 
Aiit. Const, art. II, § 26; 
Colo. Const, art. DC, § 8; (students or teachers) 
Del. Conat. art. 1, § 2; 
Ga. Const, art. I, § 1, H IV; 
Ind. Const, art. I, §§ 5, 7; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7; 
Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, arts. 36, 37; 
Mich. Const, art. I, § 18; 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 17; 
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18; 
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4, and art. VII, § 11; 
N.M. Const, art. VII, § 3, and art. XII, § 9; 
(Matthew Bender & Co. Inc.) (Pub 649) 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW App. 4A-18 
Or. Const, art. I, §§ 6; 
Tenn. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 6; 
Tex. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 5; 
Utsh Cc..^. art. I, § 4, and art. X, § 8; 
W. Va. Const, art. m, §§ 11, 15. 
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